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flexible in the distribution of its burden. Although it is rare to find an individual who enjoys paying taxes, "[t]axes are what we pay for civilized
13 7

society."

DAVID M. HUDSON

SECTION 1.031: LIKE KIND EXCHANGES OF
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
INTRODUCnON

Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code is a nonelective provision'
which permits the nonrecognition of gain or loss if property held for productive use in a trade or business is exchanged for property of a like kind
which is to be similarly held or used.2 Although the only two relevant
cases suggest that section 1031 does apply to the exchange of partnership
interests, 3 all the questions in this area have not been resolved.
There are two primary hurdles to obtaining a like kind exchange and
qualifying for nonrecognition treatment of an exchange of partnership interests. The first is the potential inclusion of a partnership interest as a type
of interest specifically ineligible under section 1031(a) for nonrecognition
treatment. Even if this hurdle is surmounted, nonrecognition is only available if the partnership interests exchanged are held to be of a "like kind."
The resolution of these two major issues may be influenced by which underlying theory of partnerships is adopted by the court-the "entity" theory
or the "aggregate" theory. Since the courts tend to apply whichever theory
produces the desired result, the analysis of individual situations is further
clouded. Additionally, the critical determinations can be made only after
determining which law--state or federal-

controls the determination.

This note discusses these and related problems in detail in order to
provide some clarity to the analysis of the application of section 1031 to
the exchange of partnership interests. After briefly discussing the relevant
statutory history and the distinction between the entity and aggregate
partnership theories, this note analyzes the two cases that have dealt with
137. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipines v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1. Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1031 with §1033.
2. Section 1031(a) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held
for productive use in trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or
other property held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates
of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest)
is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in
trade or business or for investment."
3. Estate of Meyer, Sr., 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (1974); Miller
v. United States, 1963-2 U.S.T.C. 9606 (S.D. Ind. 1963). But see 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 3, nonacquiescing in Estate of Meyer, Sr., 58 T.C. 311 (1972).
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the applicability of section 1031 to exchanges of partnership interests. After
a critical examination of the two major hurdles to the application of 1031
to exchanges of partnership interests, the note concludes with a discussion
of the tax consequences that result in a typical exchange if nonrecognition

treatment is not permitted.
STATUTORY HSTORY

Section 1031 and its predecessors have been a part of the law since 1921. 4
The congressional policy underlying the enactment appears to be that it is
unfair to tax an exchange where the property received is a continuation of
the old investment still unliquidated. 5 While the provision may also have
arisen from a concern over the administrative problems involved in the
computation of gain or loss in transactions covered by the section, it is
doubtful that any such concern was the motivation. 7 Section 1031(b) requires
recognition of gain if, in addition to the like kind property, boot is received;
this necessitates valuation of the boot.8 The valuation problem is equally
prevalent in exchanges of property not of like kind in which valuation is
required. 9

4. Revenue Act of 1921, PuB. L. No. 98, tit. II, §202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 230 (1923); INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §1031. As early as 1918 certain types of exchanges involving taxpayers

were excepted from the general rule of recognizing gain or loss. A regulation issued under
the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that no gain or loss from the acquisition and subsequent
disposition of property would be recognized unless there was a change in substance and
not merely in form. TREAS. REc. 65 Art., 1563 (1920). See also 3 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATiON §2021 at 80 (1972 rev. ed.).

5. The Senate Committee on Finance's report on this portion of the 1921 act stated:
"Section 202 (subdivision C) provides new rules for those exchanges or 'trades' in which,
although a technical 'gain' may be realized under the present law, the taxpayer actually
realizes no cash profit." Senate Comm. on Finance, Report on Internal Revenue Bill of
1921, S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921). See also H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1939) which stated: "It was the purpose of the statute to postpone taxation until
there had been a substantial change in the form of the investment."
6. See Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159, 1951-2 U.S.T.C. 9482,
at 17,249 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952), in which the court states
this was the reason for §1031's enactment.
7. Cf. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 1959-2 U.S.T.C. %9641 (2d
Cir. 1959). The court, addressing the speculation raised in Century Electric, stated: "Congress
was primarily concerned with the inequity, in the case of an exchange, of forcing a
taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still tied up in a continuing investment. ....
These considerations, rather than concern for the difficulty of the administrative task of
making the valuations . . . were at the root of the Congressional purpose in enacting
§§112(b)(1) and (e)." Id. at 456, 1959-2 U.S.T.C. at 73,681.
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1031(b) provides in pertinent part: "If an exchange
would be within the provisions of subsection (a) . . . if it were not for the fact that
property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such provisions to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not
in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property."
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1001. See, e.g., Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v.
United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. 9687 (Ct. Cl. 1954).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/6

2

Gragg: Section 1031: Like Kind Exchanges of Partnership Interests
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

X

The predecessors of section 1031 all excluded exchanges of stock in trade
or other property held primarily for sale,1o but the original provision extended
broadly to exchanges of all other types of like kind property, including
stocks and bonds." This large loophole 12 was closed by a 1923 amendment
excluding "stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or
13
beneficial interest or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest."
The Revenue Act of 1923 changed the language and the content slightly
to what is the present section 1031(a). A Ways and Means Committee report
on the reenactment of the section in 1934 described the provision as follows:
The law has provided for 12 years that gain or loss is recognized on
exchanges of property having a fair market value such as stocks,
bonds, and negotiable instruments . . . but not on other exchanges
of property solely for property of like kind. In other words, profit
or loss is recognized in the case of exchanges of notes or securities which
are essentially like money

.

.

.14

This brief overview indicates that the original congressional intent in enacting the provision has been followed in subsequent enactments and amendments.
PARTNERSHIP LAw THEORY

The determination of the applicability of section 1031 to exchanges of
partnership interests is complicated by the historical ambiguities of the
statutory and common law characterizations of partnerships. The early
common law regarded a partnership as an aggregate or collection of individuals 15 in which partnership activities and the legal incidents thereof were
considered those of the partners, not those of the partnership as a separate
entity.'6 Diametrically opposed to the aggregate or the common law theory
of partnership is the entity concept first adopted by the English Law Mer-

10. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, PUB. L. No. 98, tit. II, §202(c)(1) 42 Stat. 230
(1923); Revenue Act of 1928, PUB. L. No. 154, tit. I, §112(b)(1), 47 Stat 196 (1933); Revenue
Act of 1938, PUB. L. No. 554, tit. I, §112(b)(1), 52 Stat. 485 (1938).
11. Revenue Act of 1921, PUB. L. No. 98, tit. II, §202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 230 (1923). See
Girard Trust Co., 16 B.T.A. 308 (1929) (decided under the 1921 Act allowing an exchange
of stock for bonds and stock).
12. A letter written January 13, 1923, from the Secretary of the Treasury to the
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee stated: "This provision of the act is being
widely abused. Many brokers, investment houses, and bond houses have established exchange
departments and are advertising that they will exchange securities for their customers
in such a manner as to result in no taxable gain." H.R. REP. No. 1432, 67th Cong., 4th
Sess. (1923).
13. Revenue Act of 1923, PUB. L. No. 545, ch. 294, 42 Stat. 1560 (1923).
14. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
15. Cf. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802 (1951);
X-L Liquors v. Taylor, 17 N.J. 444, 111 A.2d 753 (1955).
16. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP §3. at 18 (1968)
(hereinafter cited as CRANE &: BROMBERG).
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chants,17 which treats a partnership as a legal entity separate and distinct
from its members.' 8
When the first committee was appointed by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to draft a uniform partnership act in 1902,19
partnership law in the United States was an amalgamation of the strict common law aggregate theory and the more flexible mercantile theory.20 Although
the original charge to the committee was to draft a uniform act based on the
mercantile or entity theory,21 as the result of disagreement among members
of the committee, the final draft was a compromise which rejected a straight
entity approach.2 2 The resulting Uniform Partnership Act, now adopted in
forty-six states, 23 reflects both the entity and the aggregate concepts- by
applying each concept to different partnership problems. However, both
the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
adopted in forty eight states 2 5 provide that a partnership interest is property
separate and distinct from the partnership's underlying assets. 2 8
PARTNERsm' TAx TREATMENT
Although early federal income tax law taxed partnerships as entities, 27
the present law adopts neither the aggregate nor entity theory exclusively.
Rather, "it adopts the criterion of the desirable result and applies whichever theory will produce that result." 28 Thus, the present law applies an
aggregate or conduit approach to the taxation of income,2 9 but applies an
entity theory for other purposes.30
17. Id. at 11.
18. This is consistently done in civil law jurisdictions by code or judicial usage. Id.
at 18.
19. 6 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM
LAWs ANNOTATED 5 (Master Ed. 1969) (hereinafter cited as U.L.A.).
20. See WLLIS, WILMs ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §1.03 (1971).

21. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A

Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29

HARv. L. REv. 158, 159 (1915).

22. Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform PartnershipAct an Aggregate or an
Entity?, 16 VAND. L. Rzv. 377, 378 (1963). The original draftsman, Dean Ames of Harvard
Law School, who favored the entity approach, died prior to the final draft. Lewis, supra
note 21, at 159.
23. 6 U.L.A., supranote 19, at 5 (Cum. Supp.).
24. "The language of the Act reminds us of . . . some political platforms. There
is some language which will please those who approve the aggregate theory. There is
other language which will please those who approve the entity theory." E. WARREN,
CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WrrHoUT INCORPORATION 300 (1929).
25. 6 U.LA., supra note 19, at 65 (Cum. Supp.).
26. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, §26; UNIFORM LIMrrIED PARTNERSmp ACT, §18. 6 U.L.A.,
supra note 19, at 349, 602.
27. See War Revenue Act of 1917, PuB. L. No. 377, ch. 63, §201, 40 Stat. 303 (1917).
28. WILLIS, supra note 20, at §1.03.
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §701. The conduit approach connotes the preservation
of the characterization of the income of the partnership level.
30. For example, subject to certain limitations, partners and partnerships may have
different taxable years. Id. §705(b). Also, partners may have transactions with the partnership in a non-partner capacity. Id. §707(a).
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Particularly relevant is the modified entity approach applied to the
sale or exchange of a partnership interest if section 1031 is not applicable.
Congress in enacting the 1954 Code had several alternative methods of
treating the sale or exchange of a partnership interest. Following the case
law results based on the 1939 Code,3 1 Congress could have continued to apply
an entity approach by treating a partnership interest as a capital asset. Conversely, Congress could have chosen an aggregate approach which treats an
individual partner as selling his share of each partnership asset, with the
character of the gain being determined asset-by-asset.32 Rather than choosing
either of these extremes, however, Congress chose a modified entity approach. 33
Section 741 treats gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a partnership
as resulting from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. Section 7514 modifies
that rule by providing that amounts received that are attributable to unrealized receivables- 5 of the partnership or to substantially appreciated inventory"6 items are considered amounts realized from the sale or exchange
of property other than a capital asset. As a result of the broad scope of
section 751, the modified entity approach approximates an asset-by-asset
aggregate theory.
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF SECTION

1031

TREATMENT OF

EXCHANGES OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS

The only two cases presenting the issue have held section 1031 at least
potentially applicable to exchanges of partnership interests. 31 Estate of Meyer,
Jr.3 8 involved an exchange by Rollin E. Meyer, Sr. and Rollin E. Meyer, Jr.
31. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656, 1950-2 U.S.T.C. §9384 (7th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 912 (1951); United States v. Donoho, 275 F.2d 489, 1960-1 U.S.T.C. 9315
(8th Cir. 1960). But see Bright v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 865, 1953-7 U.S.T.C. 19518
(E.D. Pa. 1953); Krist v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 548, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 19424 (9th Cir.
1956) (involving an exception where the partnership held installment obligations).
32. Cf. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 1946-1 U.S.T.C. 9120 (2d Cir. 1945) (sale
of a business conducted as a sole proprietorship).
33. Section 741 provides: "'In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be
considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and inventory items which
have appreciated substantially in value)." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §741.
34. Section 751, commonly called the "collapsible partnership" provision, is designed
to disallow the conversion of ordinary income to capital gains. Section 751's counterpart in
subchapter C, §341, serves the same function for corporations with one major difference.
The collapsible corporation is based on intent whereas the collapsible partnership provision applies regardless of intent. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341.
35. In addition to including accounts receivables for goods and services which have
not previously been included in income, the term includes potential §12.t5 and §1250
income, farm recapture property and the gain on the sale of mining property (as defined in
§617(d)(1)), which would be treated as ordinary income under §617(d)(1). INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §751(c). See generally, WILLIS, supra note 20, at §20.02-.05.
36. The §751(d) definition of inventory is broader than simply stock in trade. It
includes other non-capital assets which are not subject to §1231. Id. §751(d).
37. Estate of Meyer, Sr., 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.
1974); Miller v. United States, 1963-2 U.S.T.C. 9606 (D.C. S.D. Ind. 1963).
38. 58 T.C. 311 (1972), afj'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
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of their 50%, interests in a California general partnership for interests in a
California limited partnership. Meyer, Sr. received a 157 limited partnership interest and his son received a 20%o general partnership interest, and
each treated the exchanges as tax free under section 1081(a).
The Commissioner unsuccessfully contended that both exchanges were
excepted from section 1031 because the interests under California law3 9 were
choses in action, a type of property excluded by the parenthetical clause in
section 1081(a). The Tax Court, however, distinguished the cases relied on
by the Commissioner because they involved the characterization of the interest
of a deceased partner 40o Addressing the broader question of whether the
partnership interest fell within any of the proscribed classifications in the
parenthetical language, the court stated:
We are not dealing with trading in investment securities or similar
intangibles. The transactions . . . were exchanges of proprietary
(partnership) interests in one small business solely for proprietary
(partnership) interests in a second small business before and after
which both businesses were going concerns engaged in the same
principal activity.41
Apparently the Tax Court, in concluding that the interests were not within
the precluded classifications, applied an entity theory of partnership. By
referring to interests exchanges as proprietary interests in small businesses,
the court appears to be attempting to classify the interests as not being
readily convertible to cash, and therefore outside the parenthetical proscrip42
tion of section 1031(a).
The Commissioner was successful, however, in his contention that the
exchange by Meyer, Sr. of his general partnership interest for a limited
partnership interest was not like kind exchange. The court pointed out
several differences in the rights and liabilities of general and limited partners
and stated that the "variousness of the natures of the general and the limited
partnership interest is substantial enough to warrant invocation of the
principle calling for strict construction of the exception to the rule that
where gain is involved it will be recognized and taxed when it is realized." 43
This represents an additional application of the entity approach, although the
court's qualification of the holding clouds the issue. The court initially
focused on the different characteristics of general and limited partnership
interests, which implied that the like kind determination is to be made at
39. The Commissioner relied on two cases which held that a deceased partner's
interest was little more than the personal representative's enforceable right to an accounting
and cash liquidation. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928); McClennen v. Commissioner,
131 F.2d 165, 1942-2 U.S.T.C. J10,215 (Ist Cir. 1942).
40. 58 T.C. at 313.
41.
42.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 4-14 supra.

43. The court listed as distinguishing features that a limited partner, unlike a general
partner, is not personally liable for partnership debts, that he is entitled to priority in
liquidation and that, absent an agreement to the contrary, the death of a limited
partner does not work a dissolution of the limited partnership. 58 T.C. at 314.
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the partnership interest level. But the court then confined its decision "to
a situation where both partnerships owned the same type of underlying assets
-in this case, rental real estate," ' 44 a qualification which indicated that an
aggregate approach is deemed appropriate in making the like kind determination.
The dissent rejected the dual entity-aggregate approach of the majority.
Arguing that if the underlying assets are the crucial factor and the aggregate
approach is appropriate, the dissent observed that an exchange of a general
for a limited partnership interest is identical to an exchange of two general
partnership interests as long as the underlying property interests are of like
kind.45 Rejecting this rationale, the dissent would apply an entity approach
and find that limited and general partnership interests, while differing in
quality or grade, nevertheless, are of like kind. 46 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
per curiam the portion of the Tax Court's decision which disallowed nonrecognition to Meyer, Sr.'s exchange.4 7 It applied an entity approach and
found that a general partnership interest is of a different kind than a limited
4
partnership interest. 8
The only other case which deals with the application of section 1031 to
exchanges of partnership interests is Miller v. U.S., which succinctly held that
an exchange of interests in general partnerships carrying on different types
of retail businesses is an exchange of property of like kind. 49 Paraphrasing
language from the legislative history of section 1031, the court stated:
Plaintiff's additional investment in Miller's Supply Company was
substantially a continuation of his investment in Miller's Tavern unliquidated and carried over to Miller's Supply Company.50
The court clearly applied a straight entity approach in making the like
kind determination. Both partnerships held notes and inventories which,
if an aggregate approach had been applied, would have been ineligible
for nonrecognition under section 1031. While it could be argued that the
like kind determination was made on the basis of the nature of the enterprises retail sales- this proposition finds no support in the decision or in
prior case law. The court simply stated without discussion that the partner51
ship interests were not within the parenthetically proscribed classifications.
In summary, the two cases allowing partnership interests to be exchanged
under section 1031 leave many questions unanswered. The remainder of
this article will be devoted to an analysis of these problems.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 315.
46. Id. at 316.
47. Estate of Meyer, Sr. v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
48. Id.
9606 (S.D. Ind. 1963). The taxpayer had exchanged a 50%
49. 1963-2 U.S.T.C.
interest in a tavern for a 25% partnership interest in an automobile and home supply
store.
50.

Id. at 89,453.

51.

Id.
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The initial hurdle to be overcome in applying section 1031 to exchanges
of partnership interests is the avoidance of the classification of the partnership
interest as one of the prohibited interests enumerated in the parenthetical
language of section 1031(a): stock in trade, or other property held primarily
for sale, stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial
interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest. The
first question is which law, state or federal, controls in making the determination. More specifically, is the state law classification of an interest as
a security or other prohibited interest controlling, or do these terms have
a federal definition? It is well settled that the meaning to be given language
used in a federal tax statute is purely a federal question.52 Although state
law creates legal rights and interests, labels applied by state law are not
53
binding for federal tax purposes.
These principles may appear inconsistent with the Tax Court's approach
in Meyer since the the court looked to California law to determine whether
a partnership interest was a chose in action." Because the phrase "chose in
action" is borrowed from the common law and has no federal common law
meaning,55 however, it may be argued that Congress intended to borrow the
state law meaning of the phrase.
Although some of the terms within the parenthetical proscription, such
as stocks, bonds, notes, certificates of trust and evidences of indebtedness
have a reasonably definite meaning, the remaining terms- certificates of
beneficial interest, other securities and evidences of interest- are much more
vague. The limited judicial interpretation of these interests suggests they
are not to be broadly applied. In Frederick R. Home,5 the Tax Court held
that a transferable membership in an organized commodity exchange was
qualified property under section 1031. The court noted that "the certificates
of membership are not dealt in either as commodities of trade or for investment purposes" and that "their sale is closely restricted and is subject
to the approval of the governing body." 57 This supportive reasoning is similar
to that of the Tax Court in Meyer regarding the inability of the taxpayer to
readily convert the interest into cash. 58 The weakness of this analysis is
apparent, however, when a comparison is made with closely-held corporate
52. This point was clearly made in Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 1940-1
U.S.T.C. 9210 (1940), in which the Supreme Court stated that "[i]f it is found in a given
case that an interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed,
the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right by
state law." Id. at 81, 1940-1 U.S.T.C. at 9546.

53. See also Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 1967-2 U.S.T.C.
(1967).
54. See text accompanying notes 89-40 supra.

12,491

55. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. 5 T.C. 250 (1945). See also Simon England, 1940 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 140,463 (deferred annuity contracts represent insurance and not evidence of debt); C.C. Wyman & Co.,
8 B.TA. 408 (1927) (allowing the tax free exchange of memberships).
57. 5 T.C. at 253.
58. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
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stock. In the close corporation context, one could have a small incorporated
business and no liquidity due to the lack of a market for the stock, however,
it is quite clear that section 1031 non-recognition treatment would be precluded if such stock interests were exchanges. 59 Perhaps the problem is the
all-encompassing term "stock" and not the determination that a partnership
interest and a membership certificate are outside the excluded classifications.
The court in Home concluded that because the "revenue statutes carry
no definition of the term . . . 'securities' . . . the terms must be given

their ordinary meaning," ' 6 1 then examined New York case law for the definition
of a security. 1 Currently, because of the body of federal case law that has
defined the term "security" as used in section 2(1) of the Securities Act of
1933,62 it is more likely that federal rather than state law would be relied
upon by a court to define "security" as used in section 1031(a).
The present case law approach to identify a security involves a determination of who retains immediate control over the essential managerial conduct
of an enterprise.6 3 If the "investor" retains no control, then regardless of his
active involvement in the venture,6 4 the courts will generally find a security
is present. This test would require a case-by-case application to partnerships
to determine whether a security was involved. There is no barrier, however,
to classifying a limited partnership interest as a security under the securities
law. Because of the passive role of a limited partner, a limited partnership
interest fits squarely within the securities law definition of a security. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that limited partnership
interests in real estate ventures will generally constitute a security under
the 1933 Act.6 5 In addition, many state courts have held that limited partnership certificates are securities under their Blue Sky laws. °6 This analysis
suggests that partnership interests, particularly limited partnership interests,
are vulnerable to classification as securities, which are proscribed interests
under section 1031(a).
59. Cf. Evert A. Bancker, 31 B.T.A. 14 (1934), aff'd, 76 F.2d 1, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 19207
(5th Cir. 1935); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1934). This
would not be the case, however, if the exchange of stock qualified under INT. REV. CODE
oF 1954, §368.
60. 5 T.C. at 253.
61. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C. §77(b)(1 )(1970).
63. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973).
64. In the standard previously applied by the courts, the determination was based
on whether the investor was an active participant or whether profits came solely from the
efforts of others. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
65. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (August 8, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 11705 (1967).
In addition, several state Blue Sky Laws specifically include limited partnership interests
in their definition of a security. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §551.02(13) (1975 Supp.); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §1-102(t) (1976 Supp.).
66. See, e.g., People v. Woodson, 78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d 586 (1947); Conroy v.
Schultz, 80 N.J. Super. 443, 194 A.2d 20 (1963). But cI. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291
S.W.2d 704 (1956).
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Assuming arguendo that partnership interests can avoid the proscribed
classifications, the fact that the partnership assets include stocks, bonds and
other proscribed assets may have an impact on this classification determination. The presence of sizable amounts of notes, accounts receivable and inventories in Miller was not even considered by the court.67 Initially this
appears to be contrary to the statutory intent. If, however, the common
denominator of the proscribed assets is their liquidity, permitting a 1031
exchange of an interest in a partnership holding such assets is not necessarily
contrary to the statutory intent. Generally, a partner has no means of liquidating the partnership assets, short of causing a dissolution of the partnership.
If a going business is involved, this could result in a substantial loss which
would preclude the dissolution alternative. This analysis, however, also reaches
an inequitable result when compared to a like enterprise conducted as a
corporation.
IKE KIND DETERmINATION

The requirement that the exchange be for property of like kind is the
statutory language which reflects the legislative intent to permit the continuation of the old investment still unliquidated. The regulations provide that
"the words 'like kind' have reference to the nature or character of the
property and not to its grade or quality." 68
Again, the initial question in the analysis is whether state or federal
law controls the like kind determination. Applying the Supreme Court's
decision in Morgan, the proper analysis is to look to state law to ascertain
the interests or right created thereby. The federal law is then applied to
determine if the interests created under state law are of like kind within the
meaning of section 1031(a).69 This analysis appears to have been used in
earlier cases ruling on the like kind question.70 For example the Tax Court
in Midfield Oil Co.,71 while recognizing both interests as real property under
state law, held that an oil and gas payment and an overriding oil and gas
royalty were not property of like kind. This analysis would also support the
Treasury's position that the exchange of a fee simple for a leasehold of a
fee for less than thirty years, both interests in real property, is not an exchange of property of like kind. 72
More recent decisions, however, appear to have focused solely on the
state law classification of the interest and have created broad classes of
property, such as real property and personalty, to which the like kind
determination is then applied. 73 Because inconsistent results would occur if
two states classified the same set of property rights differently, this more recent
67. 1963-2 U.S.T.C. 9606 (1963).
68. TRAs. REG. §1.1031(a)-1(b).

69. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
70. Kay Kimbell, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940); Midfield Oil Co., 39 B.T.A. 1154 (1939). Cf.
Oregon Lumber Co., 20 T.C. 192 (1953).

71. 39 B.TA. 1154 (1939).
72. Th.As. REG. §1.1031(a)-I(c)(2).
73. See, e.g., Fleming v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 78, 1957-1 U.S.T.C.
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analysis seems improper. However, the courts, with a few minor deviations74
appear to accept the proposition that interests in real property are of like
kind. The portion of the Meyer decision holding that a general and a limited
partnership interest are not property of like kind suggests that the courts are
not taking as liberal an approach to personalty as they have to real property.
The Meyer conclusion was reached despite the fact that both the Uniform
Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act provide that a
partner's interest in a partnership is personalty.75
If the courts apply an eitity approach in making the like kind determination, as was apparently the case in Miller and Meyer, the question of whether
all personalty is considered like kind property is not critical. Presumably the
exchange of a general for a general and a limited for a limited partnership
interest would constitute exchanges of like kind property. If the courts,
however, apply an aggregate theory and make the like kind determination
by examining the underlying assets, the question of whether all personalty
is considered like kind property could be critical since it would be an unusual
situation in which both partnerships held the same type of personal property.
SUBVERSION OF SECTIONs

741

AND

751

Application of sections 741 and 751 to a hypothetical situation will demonstrate the results if section 1031 is inapplicable to an exchange of partnership
interests.
Balance Sheet of the ABCD Partnership
Assets
Cash
Accounts Receivable
Inventory
Buildings (recomputed basis 160,000)

Capital Account
A
B
C
D

Adjusted Basis

FMV

40,000
-020,000
140,000
200,000

40,000
40,000
80,000
180,000
340,000

Adjusted Basis
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000

FMV
85,000
85,000
85,000
85,000

1957), rev. on other grounds sub nom., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260,
1958-1 U.S.T.C. %9428 (1958); Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181, 1941-2 U.S.T.C.
9638 (5th Cir. 1941).
74. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra and note 76 infra.
75. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Aar §26; UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr §18.
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Balance Sheet of the WXYZ Partnership
Assets
Cash
Accounts Receivable
Inventory
Building

Capital Account
W
X
Y
Z

Adjusted Basis

FMV

20,000
-0120,000
240,000

20;000"
100,000
80,000
160,000

280,000

360,000

Adjusted Basis

FMV

120,000
120,000
120,000
120,000

90,000
90,000
90,000
90,000

If B exchanges his interest in the ABCD Partnership for W's interest in
the WXYZ Partnership, sections 741 and 751 yield the following results: B
would recognize $40,000 of gain (amount realized, $90,000, less adjusted
basis, $50,000). The characterization of this would be as follows: (1) $10,000
ordinary income under section 751(c) representing B's share of the accounts
receivable; (2) $5,000 of ordinary income under section 751(c) representing
B's share of the section 1250 recapture; (3)$15,000 of ordinary income under
section 751(d) representing B's share of the substantially appreciated inventory; and (4) $10,000 of capital gain under section 741. Section 751(c)
requires W to recognize $25,000 of ordinary income representing his share
of the accounts receivable. To reflect that inclusion, W's basis in the partnership interest is increased to $145,000. W now has $60,000 of capital loss
(amount realized, $85,000, less adjusted basis, $145,000).
The function of sections 741 and 751 is to prevent the conversion of
what would normally be ordinary income into capital gains, which would
occur if one partnership had substantial section 751 property and the other
primarily capital assets or section 1231 property.76 Recapture, one specific
type of section 751 property, provides a wrinkle to the above analysis in
which the aggregate versus entity dichotomy is again relevant. If a straight
entity theory is applied, the recapture problem is ignored. The exchanging
76. In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. P.G.
Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 1958-1 U.S.T.C. 19428 (1958) held that an exchange did not

satisfy the property of like kind .requirement. The court disallowed the exchange of oil
payment rights for a fee interest in a ranch, both interests in real property, stating that
the assignment of the oil payment was merely an arrangement for delayed cash payment

of the purchase price of the ranch. The court found no conversion of a capital asset
because the oil payment when received would have constituted ordinary income to the
original owner. This reasoning appears applicable to a partnership interest in a partnership with substantial §751 property. If the partner had continued to hold the original
interest he would have recognized ordinary income upon the disposition or collection of
the §751 property. The P.G. Lake decision may control this situation and require a finding
that the property is not of like kind.
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partners would take carrover bases in their new partnership interest-7 and
would be subject to recognition of recapture if the new partnership entered
into a transaction which triggered the recapture provisions. This recognition
as to the new partner could be altered if the optional adjustment 8 to basis
of partnership property is elected.7 9 Section 743 provides the new partner
with a special basis in the partnership assets which in the aggregate equals his
basis in his partnership interest. Thus, if the optional adjustment were in
effect, the amount of recognition to the new partner as a result of a partnership transaction which triggers recapture would reflect the adjustment. If
the new partner's basis in his partnership interest were high in relation
to the partnership's aggregate basis in its assets, the new partner could avoid
recognition totally.
If an aggregate theory is applied in making the like kind determination,
however, both section 1245 and section 1250 provide a limited exception to
recapture recognition where section 1031 is applicable.8 0 This exception, requires recognition to the extent of the fair market value of property received
which is not section 1245 or 1250 property regardless of the fact that this
non-section 1245 or 1250 property qualifies under section 1031.1 Thus, unless
there are parallel assets in both partnerships, some recapture will be required; this would be in addition to the boot recuired to be recognized if
section 1031(b) were applicable. If either partnership held property with
substantial recapture, application of section 1245(b) could defeat the nonrecognition exchange. Additionally, the question of the carryover taint
provided by the regulation still remains.82 Although one commentator has
suggested that the taint might attach to the partnership interest itself and
the recapture provision triggered by a subsequent disposition, 3 this approach
has no statutory basis and appears clearly erroneous. Since there is no method
for providing for the carryover taint, the exceptions to sections 1245 and 1250
do not appear to be available in this situation.
EFFECT OF THE ASSUMPTION OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES

An additional problem arises on the transfer of partnership liabilities
between the exchanging partners. The analysis of the problem involves
section 752 and 1031(b) and (d) and assumes a straight entity approach. In
order to understand the problem, it is first necessary to understand the
77.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954 §1031(d).

78. Id. §743.
79. In order for the optional adjustments provision to be activated it is necessary
for the partnership to file an election with the Secretary as provided for in §754. Id.
§754. Section 732(d) provides a limited exception to the partnership election requirement
by allowing the partner to make the election in limited circumstances. Id. §732(d).
80. Id. §§1245(b)(4), 1250(d)(4).
81. Id.§§1245(b)(4)(B), 1250(d)(4).
82. TEAs. REG. §1.1245-2(c)(4). The only statutory authority for this is the parenthetical
clause "whether in respect of the same or other property" found in INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §1245(a)(2).
83. Blankenship, After the Meyer Case: An Analysis of Tax-Free Partnership Exchanges, 38 J. TAXATION 278, 279-80 (1973).
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mechanics of how partnership liabilities8 4 affect the basis of a partner's partnership interest. First, section 752(c) provides: "[A] liability to which property
is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be
considered as a liability of the owner of the property."8 5 The regulations
offer the following elaboration on this proposition:
However, where none of the partners have [sic] any personal liability
with respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mortgage on
real estate acquired by the partnership without the assumption by
the partnership or any of the partners of any liability on the mortgage)
then all partners, including limited partners, shall be considered as
sharing such liability under section 752(c) in the same proportion as
they share the profits.88
Section 752 further provides that a partner's share of the liabilities of the
partnership is reflected in the partner's basis in his partnership interest.
Therefore, an increase or decrease in a partner's share of the partnership's
liabilities is reflected by a corresponding increase or decrease in the partner's
8s
basis in his partnership interest
When the principle of Crane v. Commissioner 8 is applied, the partner's
share of the partnership liabilities (as computed under Section 752(c)) assumed in the exchange of the partnership interests are included in determining
the amount realized. The liabilities are deemed transferred directly between
the exchanging partners, regardless of whether the liabilities are specifically
assumed or simply taken subject to the liabilities. Section 1031(d) then treats
the amount of the liabilities assumed as money received by the taxpayer;
as such, the liabilities assumed constitute boot under section 1031(b). The
Service has to some extent, softened this effect by following an administrative
practice of permitting a "balancing of [the] liabilities when mortgaged
property is exchanged for mortgaged property and each party to the exchange
assumes the mortgage of the other party."8 9 Despite this amelioration, the
boot generated may preclude the exchange unless the liabilities of the exchanging partners are relatively equal.

84. Liabilities as used in §752 include a partnership obligation for the payment of
outstanding trade accounts, notes and accrued expenses, whether or not recorded on
the partnership books under its accounting method. Rev. Rul. 60-345, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL.
211.
85. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §752(c).
86. TREAS. REG. §1.752-1(e). This principle is extremely important to limited partnerships which are structured as tax shelters.
87. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §§752(a) and (b).
88. 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. 9217 (1947). Section 752(d) assures this result by
providing: "In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, liabilities
shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange

of property not associated with partnerships."
89. Rev. Rul. 59-229, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 180, 182. Although the revenue ruling speaks
in terms of "mortgages" and "assumed," there would appear to be no policy justification
for restricting the balancing amelioration to real property or to liabilities that are
assumed as opposed to those that are taken subject to,
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